NOTES
REINSTATING VACATED FINDINGS IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
CLASS ACTIONS: RECONCILING
GENERAL TELEPHONE CO. v. FALCON
WITH HILL v. WESTERN ELECTRIC CO.
Recently, in General Telephone Co. v. Falcon,1 the Supreme Court
severely restricted the ability of private plaintiffs to bring Title VI12
employment discrimination class actions.3 Before Falcon, some federal
courts allowed across-the-board employment discrimination class
actions. 4 In these courts, a plaintiff alleging one type of employment
discrimination could represent a class alleging several types of
employment discrimination. The Falcon Court, however, relying on
the commonality and typicality requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, 5 held that class representatives alleging employment
discrimination can represent only the class of people alleging the "same
harm or injury" as themselves. 6 A private plaintiff alleging
discrimination in promotion practices, for example, can no longer
7
represent a class alleging discrimination in hiring practices.
The end of the private across-the-board approach to Title VII
employment discrimination class actions means that victims of different
1. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
3. See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text and note 25.
5. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) provides in relevant part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued
as representative parties on behalf of all only if... (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
6. 457 U.S. at 156-61; accord East Tex. Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403
(1977) (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974)). This
rule applies only to private actions. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
has special statutory authority to bring class actions under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976) and
therefore need not comply with Rule 23. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156, General TeL Co. v. EEOC, 446
U.S. 318, 323 (1980). This note deals only with private actions.
7. This was the holding in Falcon. See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.

DUKE LAW JOURA4L

[Vol. 1983:821

types of employment discrimination must be represented separately
unless they can prove a "general policy of discrimination." Because of
the difficulty of proving such a policy, 9 the novelty of the exception,' 0
t judgments for
and the narrow definition of "same harm or injury,""I
class representatives bringing broad class actions will often be reversed
on appeal for violating the commonality and typicality requirements of
Rule 23.12 These reversals generally require costly recertification of
improperly represented subclasses and retrial of the substantive issues.
In Hill v. Western Electric Co.,' 3 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit suggested a procedure to reduce the need for such
recertification and retrial. The Hill court provided for reinstatement of
the original trial court's findings if proper plaintiffs intervene on
4
remand and reinstatement would not prejudice either side.'
This note first reviews the recent treatment of the "same harm or
injury" requirement and examines its probable impact on employment
discrimination class action litigation. ' 5 Next, the note analyzes the Hill
proposal in light of Falcon.16 Because the Hill proposal involves
reinstating findings that have been vacated, the note then analyzes the
8. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15; see infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
9. Cf Abron v. Black & Decker, Inc., 654 F.2d 951, 955, 961 (4th Cir. 1981) (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting) (The "same harm or injury" requirement is a "procedural barrier which will effectively
limit the substantive rights of minority employees under Title VII ....
Few employers have a
'single' promotion practice from which all employees discriminatorily denied promotions suffer in
exactly the same way. The Title VII employer's promotion practices would typically be numerous

and varied.").
At least one court has held that a complaint failed to meet the standard required by the
footnote 15 exception. See Warren v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 425, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also infra note 37 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 37.
II. The Falcon Court narrowly defined what is to be considered the "same harm or injury."
The Court held that discrimination in hiring practices was sufficiently different from
discrimination in promotion practices, thereby precluding class certification under the
commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23. Similarly, job placement, firing, and
compensation practices are arguably different. See Ladele v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 95 F.R.D.
198 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (claim that employee was paid less because of his race has no common
questions of law or fact with claim that employee was discriminated against in promotions).
12. For an independent opinion that the footnote 15 exception will be the source of much
litigation, see Employment Discrimination-ABA Convention, 51 U.S.L.W. 2141-42 (Aug. 31, 1982).
13. 672 F.2d 381 (4th Cir.) [ffill I], cer. denied, 103 S. Ct. 318 (1982). The same case had
previously reached the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on a different issue. In Hill v.
Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99 (4th Cir.) [HillI],cert. denied, 444 U.S. 929 (1979). the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted the strict "same harm or injury" test on the basis of the
Supreme Court's decision in East Tex. Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); see
infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
14. See incra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 18-67 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 68-99 and accompanying text.

Vol. 1983:821]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

proposal in view of recent developments in the law of mootness. t 7 The
note concludes that the Hill proposal is consistent with Falcon and may
save time and money in handling certain class representation problems.
I.

BACKGROUND: THE "SAME HARM OR INJURY" REQUIREMENT

A. The Situation Before General Telephone Co. v. Falcon
Before Falcon, some federal courts applied an across-the-board
approach to the Rule 23 commonality and typicality requirements in
Title VII employment discrimination class actions.' 8 These courts
allowed plaintiffs alleging one type of employment discrimination to
represent a class asserting several different types of employment discrimination.19 In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
17. See infra notes 100-146 and accompanying text.
18. Two cases, Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968), and Jenkins v.
United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968), foreshadowed the emergence of the across-theboard approach in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See Rutherglen, Title VII Class
Actions, 47 U. CH1.L. REV. 688, 709-10 (1980).
19. A number of courts applying the across-the-board approach reasoned that the very nature of Title VII actions eliminates commonality and typicality problems. See, e.g., Crockett v.
Green, 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 42 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. ITrThompson Indus., 323 F. Supp. 1258, 1261-62 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Wilson v. Monsanto Co., 315 F.
Supp. 977, 979 (E.D. La. 1970). But see Wells v. Ramsay, Scarlett & Co., 506 F.2d 436, 437-38
(5th Cir. 1975) ("One may not represent a class of which one is not a part."); Cooper v. Allen, 467
F.2d 836, 839 (5th Cir. 1972).
According to the courts employing this reasoning, the common question in Title VII actions
was simply whether there had been racial discrimination. The "Damoclean threat of a racially
discriminatory policy hangs over the racial class [and] is a question of fact common to all members of the class." Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969)
(quoting Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966)). Typicality "lies
in the common thread of discrimination." 4 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERO ON CLASS ACTIONS § 7983
(1977) [hereinafter cited as H. NEWBERG].
The expansive across-the-board approach was justified on a number of grounds. including
congressional intent. See Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d at 43 ("The 'across-the-board' approach has
proved an effective means of implementing the congressional purpose embodied in the civil rights
acts."); Mack v. General Elec. Co., 329 F. Supp. 72,74 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ("A narrow construction of
Title VII would unduly restrict, if not frustrate, the Congressional purpose reflected in the passage
of this legislation."). See generally Developmentsin the Law--Employment Discriminationand Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1113-19 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Developments].
Promoting the public interest was another reason cited in support of the across-the-board
approach. Mack, 329 F. Supp. at 76 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (quotingDevelopments, supra, at 1220). The
Mack opinion also mentioned that the across-the-board approach provided a way to protect the
rights of those discriminated against but afraid to sue. Id Furthermore, the Mack court stated
that the across-the-board approach conserved time and resources. Id; accord Rosario v. New
York Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The Rosario court stated that the across-theboard approach "avoids piecemeal examination of an employer's alleged discriminatory practices
where general discrimination is being attacked. It provides an efficient means of disposing of
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Inc.,20 for example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit let a
former black employee who alleged he had been fired in violation of
Title VII represent "the class harmed by the alleged discrimination in
hiring, firing, promotion, and maintenance of facilities." 21 Other fed22
eral courts, however, refused to adopt this across-the-board approach.
I
The Supreme Court first addressed the across-the-board approach
in 1977 in East Texas Motor FreightSystem v. Rodriguez.23 The Rodriguez decision, however, did not clearly resolve whether across-theboard class actions violate the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23. Some courts held that Rodriguez precluded acrossthe-board class actions;24 other courts distinguished Rodriguez and
25
continued to use the across-the-board approach.
complaints in this area, especially when judicial economy is a pressing problem." Id at 629-30.
Chief Justice Burger does not share this view: "Rather than promoting judicial economy, the
'across-the-board' class action has promoted multiplication of claims and endless litigation." Falcon, 457 U.S. at 147 (Burger, CJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
20. 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
21. Id at 1124.
22. Coprare,e.g., Tipler v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971) and
Parham v. Southwestern Bell TeL Co.. 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970) and Mack v. General Elec.
Co., 329 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (upholding across-the-board class actions) with Pointer v.
Sampson, 62 F.R.D. 689 (D.D.C. 1974) and White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo.
1971) and Hyatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 242 (D. Conn. 1970) (rejecting across-theboard class actions).
Some confusion was generated when certain courts of appeals failed to apply the across-theboard approach consistently. Compare, e.g., Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir.
1975) (upholding an across-the-board claim) with Doctor v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 540 F.2d
699 (4th Cir. 1976) (rejecting across-the-board claim). Judge Widener of the Fourth Circuit has
stated: "Admittedly, this court has not been consistent in its attitude toward the breadth of classes
in employment discrimination litigation." Hill, 672 F.2d at 397 (Widener, J., dissenting).
23. 431 U.S. 395 (1977). InRodn'uez, three Mexican-Americans sued on behalf ofall Blacks
and Mexican-Americans who had been "denied equal employment opportunities with the company because of their race." Id at 399. The plaintiffs alleged that a no-transfer rule perpetuated
past discrimination by locking minorities into discrimiaatorily assigned positions.
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs "were not members of the class they purported to
represent" and did not "'possess the same interest and suffer the same injury' as the class members." Id at 403 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216
(1974)). Because the plaintiffs stipulated they had not been discriminated against when hired,
"they were hardly in a position to mount a classwide attack on the no-transfer rule... on the
ground that these practices perpetuated past discrimination and locked minorities into the less
desirable jobs to which they had been discriminatorily assigned." Rodri'uez, 431 U.S. at 404.
24. See, eg., Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 101-02 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
929 (1979).
25. According to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the problem in Rodrguez was
that the Court determined at the start that the plaintiffs did not have valid individual claims:
Rodnguez involved named plaintiffs who lacked a nexus with the class as a result of the
lack of merit of their individual claims ....
It is not necessary that the representative
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General Telephone Co. v. Falcon andAfter.

1. The Falcon Decision. The Supreme Court settled the acrossthe-board controversy in 1982 when it decided GeneralTelephone Co. v.
Falcon.26 In Falcon, the plaintiff alleged he had been denied a promotion because he was Mexican-American, but sued on behalf of a class
including Mexican-Americans who had been denied employment altogether. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, using the acrossthe-board approach, upheld the district court's certification of the
27
class.

The Supreme Court rejected the across-the-board approach. The
Court distinguished the question whether an individual has been

harmed by an employer's promotion practices from the question
suffer discrimination in the same way as other class members, but it is necessary that she suffer from the discrimination in some respect.
Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987,993 n.8 (5th Cir. 1978), vacatedon othergrounds,
445 U.S. 940 (1980).
This situation should be distinguished from "headless class" cases in which a plaintiff who
originally alleges a proper individual claim and is a member of the certified class fails to prove his
individual claim.
In such a case, the class claims would have been tried already and, provided the initial
certification was proper and decertification not appropriate, the claims of the class members would not need to be mooted or destroyed because subsequent events or the proof at
trial had undermined the named plaintiffs' individual claims.
Rodriquez, 431 U.S. at 406 n.12.
The Satterwhite court suggested that Rodniquez only stood for the proposition that a plaintiff
must have suffered at leastsome injury before he cani represent a class. Other courts distinguished
Rodriuez the same way and continued to apply the across-the-board approach. See, e.g., Scott v.
University of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 85 n.19 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979); Bartelson v.
Dean Witter & Co., 86 F.R.D. 657, 663-65 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Rosario v. New York Times Co., 84
F.R.D. 626, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Beasley v. Griffin, 81 F.R.D. 114, 116-17 (D. Mass. 1979);
Wajda v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 80 F.R.D. 303, 307-09 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Wofford v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 460, 473-77 (N.D. Cal. 1978); see also Note, AntidircrininationClassActions
Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure" The Transformationof Rule 23(b)(2), 88 YALE L. J.
868, 882-83 (1979) ("The conflict between the permissive and the rigorous approaches to the Rule
23(a) prerequisites was not settled by the Supreme Court's treatment of 23(a) in Rodriguez."). But
see Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 929 (1979); Tuft v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 581 F.2d 1304, 1307-08 (8th Cir. 1978); Shipp v. Memphis Area Office,
581 F.2d 1167, 1170-72 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979). See generaly Comment,
The ProperScope of Representationin Title VllActions: A Comment on East Texas Motor Freight
System, Inc., v. Rodriguez, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 175 (1978). In later cases the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit firmly established its interpretation of Rodriguez as not precluding
across-the-board class actions. See, eg., Shepard v. Beaird-Poulan, Inc., 617 F.2d 87, 89 (5th Cir.
1980); Davis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 590 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir. 1979); Camper v. Calumet
Petrochemicals, Inc., 584 F.2d 70, 71-72 (5th Cir. 1978).
Interestingly, in Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 565 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 835 (1978), a pre-Satterwhite case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit allowed an
across-the-board approach without specifically distinguishing Rodriguez.
26. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
27. Falcon v. General TeL Co., 626 F.2d 369, 374-76 (5th Cir. 1980).
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whether the individual's claim is typical of the class claim. 28 According
to the Falcon Court, proof that the employer discriminated against the
plaintiff in some way does not justify the inference that discriminatory
treatment typifies the employer's promotion practices, that it pervades
29
the company, or that it exists in other practices of the employer.
The Court was particularly concerned that if it allowed the acrossthe-board approach "every Title VII case would be a potential company-wide class action." 30 The Court found "nothing in [Title VII] to
indicate that Congress intended to authorize such a wholesale expansion of class-action litigation.131 The Falcon Court also pointed out
that overly broad class certification makes it harder for courts to determine whether there is adequate class representation and makes it more
likely the employer will not know how to defend. 32 The Court also
noted the potential "unfairness to the class members bound by the
33
judgment if the framing of the class is overbroad."
2. The Aftermath of Falcon. Courts deciding cases arising after
Falcon have abandoned the across-the-board approach. 34 The Falcon
decision, however, did not completely eliminate the across-the-board
employment discrimination suit. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) can still bring such actions because it need not
comply with Rule 23. 35 In addition, footnote fifteen of the Falcon
opinion provides a loophole for private litigants: "Significant proof that
an employer operated under a general policy of discrimination conceiv28. Justice Stevens' opinion stated:
Conceptually, there is a wide gap between (a) an individual's claim that he has been
denied a promotion on discriminatory grounds, and his otherwise unsupported allegation that the company has a policy of discrimination, and (b) the existence of a class of
persons who have suffered the same injury as that individual, such that the individual's
claim and the class claim will share common questions of law or fact and that the individual's claim will be typical of the class claims.
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157.
29. Id The Court added that these "additional inferences demonstrate the tenuous character
of any presumption that the class claims are 'fairly encompassed' within [the plaintifl'sl claim." Id
at 158.
30. Id at 159 (footnote omitted).
31. Id
32. Id at 161 (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125-27
(5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., concurring)).
33. 457 U.S. at 161.
34. See, eg., Richardson v. Byrd, 7 LAB. RFi_ REP. (BNA) (32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 603,
605-06 (5th Cir. July 22, 1983); Wheeler v. City of Columbus, 686 F.2d 1144, 1147 n.3 (5th Cir.
1982); Falcon v. General TeL Co., 686 F.2d 261, 261-62 (5th Cir. 1982); Jackson v. City of Belle
Glade, 95 F.R.D. 384, 385-86 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Ladele v. Consofidated Rail Corp., 95 F.R.D. 198,
200-05 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Hawkins v. Fulton County, 95 F.R.D. 88, 92-94 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Nation
v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 82, 85-86 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
35. See .supranote 6.

Vol. 1983:821]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

.ably could justify a class of both applicants and employees if the discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promotion practices in the
same general fashion, such as through entirely subjective decisionmaking processes." 36 Courts have not yet determined what constitutes "significant proof' under footnote fifteen. 37
36. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15.
37. Several courts have upheld across-the-board class actions based on footnote 15. In
Meyer v. MacMillen Publishing Co., 95 F.R.D. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), a group of female plaintiffs
employed by MacMillan moved to certify an across-the-board class consisting of "all women who
were, are now, or will be employed [and] all women who applied, or would have applied for
employment." Id at 412. The court noted that normally under Falcon employees cannot sue on
behalf of unsuccessful job applicants. 1d at 414. In this case, however, the court held that footnote 15 allowed such a suit:
While we do not yet have the benefit of further elaboration concerning the meaning of
"significant proof [of] . . . a general policy of discrimination," we think the affidavits
submitted by the plaintiffs meet that standard. The allegations in the affidavits concern
not only discrimination in promotions, but in all aspects of employment: salaries, titles,
offices, and, although to a lesser extent, hiring. For the purposes of this motion, plaintiffs
have made an adequate showing that the alleged discrimination "pervades" MacMillan
as to all personnel decisions.
Id at 415.
Similarly, in Shannon v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 96 F.R.D. 236, 242-43 (D.V.I. 1982),
the court held that a class consisting of encumbent employees could be represented by applicants
because the footnote 15 standard had been met. But see Warren v. ITT World Communications,
Inc., 95 F.R.D. 425, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (complaint failed to meet footnote 15 standard); supra
note 9.
It is still not known to what extent courts will try to broaden what appears to be a narrow
loophole. Although footnote 15 requires "significant proof," the Falcon opinion concedes that
"racial discrimination is, by definition, class discrimination." 457 U.S. at 157. Furthermore, a
plaintiff bringing a footnote 15 across-the-board class action has to show only that the employer
operated under a "general" policy of discrimination, manifesting itself in various practices in the
"same general fashion." The use of the word "general," coupled with a lack of explicit guidelines
and a well-established tendency of many courts to preserve as much of the across-the-board approach as possible, may result simply in an across-the-board approach with a new technical proof
requirement.
Recently, in Richardson v. Byrd, 7 LAB. REL. Rap. (BNA) (32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 603,
605-06 (5th Cir. July 22, 1983), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit indicated its willingness
to narrow the scope of the Falcon rule as much as possible. The district court in Richardson
allowed a female plaintiff who alleged employment discrimination in hiring to represent a class
consisting of employees as well as applicants. Id at 605. The court of appeals upheld the class
certification under the Falcon footnote 15 exception. Id According to the court, the Falcon Court
found that the plaintiff's complaint provided an insufficient basis for the district court to conclude
that "adjudication of his claim of discrimination inpromotion would require-the decision of any
questions of law or fact common to assertedly discriminatory hiring practices." Id (emphasis in
original). The Richardson court reasoned that the Falcon holding did not translate into a holding
that employees can never represent applicants. 1d The Richardson court noted that Falcon's footnote 15 specifically stated that an employer's "general policy" of discrimination could justify "a
class of both applicants and employees." Id (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15).
Applying this language, the Richardson court found that the plaintiff's potential employer, a
sheriff, was operating under a general policy of discrimination. Because the sheriff segregated
male and female prisoners, and "the section of the jail available for females was smaller than the
male section," the Richardson court held that the sheriff was operating under a policy that "by
necessity limited the number of female deputies that could be employed by the Sheriff's Office. As
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Until courts agree on a standard of proof, appellate courts will
inevitably find improper class certification because of the class representative's failure to meet the footnote fifteen standard.3 8 When this
happens, findings made by the trial court concerning the improper portion of the originally certified class will be vacated. 39 Proper plaintiffs
can then sue on behalf of these sub-classes, but without the benefit of

the original trial court's findings. These subsequent actions, therefore,
will often require repeating parts of the original trial, at great expense.
This inefficiency might be acceptable as a necessary consequence of
avoiding the problems of overly broad classes identified by the
Supreme Court in Falcon.40 In Hill v. Western Electric Co. ,41 however,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit suggested that, under certain circumstances, the inefficiency could be avoided by reinstating the

original trial court's findings.4 2
II.

A.

HILL v. WESTERN ELECTRIC Co.

Background

In Hill, six black plaintiffs alleged that they had been discriminated against in job placement and promotions. They sought relief on
behalf of the class discriminated against in hiring, placement, and promotions. The district court certified the class on the authority of Barnett v. W.T Grant Co. ,43 a decision by the Court of Appeals for the
such, both applicants and employees were adversely affected by the same practice." 17 LAB. REL.
REP. (BNA) (32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) at 605-06.
Richardson is significant because it does not seem to impose a difficult proof requirement on a
plaintiff who is either an applicant or an employee and who seeks to represent a class of both
applicants and employees.
For another court's discussion of possible standards for meeting the footnote 15 exception, see
Nation v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 82, 87-88, (N.D. Ga. 1982).
38. The Hill!! proposal may also apply to any case in which appellate courts hold classes to
be improperly certified because of the plaintif's failure to meet the Falcon Court's "same harm or
injury" requirement. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
39. Although no appellate court has yet considered the consequences of the plaintiff's failure
to meet the footnote 15 standard, it is common practice to vacate findings when the plaintiff is
found on appeal not to satisfy the Falcon standard. See, e.g., Eckerd Drugs, Inc. v. Brown, 102
S.Ct. 2952 (1982) (mem.).
40. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
41. 672 F.2d 381 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 318 (1982).
42. See infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
43. 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1978). In Barnet, a black plaintiff who worked for a trucking
division of a large corporation was denied "the company's normal 60-day probationary period for
fledgling over-the-road drivers because he was black." Id at 545. The district court held that the
plaintiff could only represent "that group of black persons who have unsuccessfully applied for or
requsted road driving jobs with the Company." Id at 547. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed, citing several cases from other jurisdictions upholding the across-the-board approach. The court held that the plaintiff could represent all Blacks who had applied for over-the-
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.Fourth Circuit that upheld an across-the-board approach in an analogous fact situation." The class in Hill consisted of those blacks and
females "who have applied for employment... or who will hereafter
apply." 45 The district court found that Western Electric had discriminated against blacks and women in hiring, job placement, and
promotions.46

In Hill I,47 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed in
part and remanded in part. The court interpreted the Rodriguez opinion 48 strictly, requiring that the plaintiffs allege the "same harm or injury" as all class members and rejecting the across-the-board
approach. 49 According to the court, because the plaintiffs were all em-

ployed, they could not represent the class of rejected job applicants.
The .court, therefore, vacated the district court's findings of discrimina-

tion in hiring for lack of proper class representation and remanded the
50
hiring issue to the district court.

Three new plaintiffs then filed motions in the district court to intervene, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24,51 on behalf of
the class of rejected job applicants. The potential intervenors alleged
that the defendant had refused to employ them because of their race.
The district court interpreted the terms of the remand as allowing interroad jobs, had been discouraged from applying, or had been kept ignorant of openings for overthe-road jobs because of the employer's discriminatory practices. Id at 547 n.4. The appellate
court also permitted the plaintiff to represent present, past, and future black employees who had
been or would be denied promotion to supervisory .positions because of their race. Id
44. The opinion of the Hill district court is reported at 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1175
(E.D. Va. 1976).
45. 672 F.2d at 384.
46. Id The court ordered Western Electric to "institute priority hiring and promotion of
blacks and females to remedy past discrimination." Id Moreover, the court required the company to develop and use new non-discriminatory hiring and promotion criteria. The court also
awarded the plaintiffs their lost salaries "as determined by a special master." Id
47. 596 F.2d 99 (4th Cir.) [Hill I],ceri. denied, 444 U.S. 929 (1979).
48. See supra note 23.
49. In HillI, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to follow the courts that
had interpreted .Rodriquez as only holding that a plaintiff must have suffered at least some injury
before he would be allowed to represent a class. See supra note 25.
50. Hil 1, 596 F.2d at 107.
51. Federal Rule 24 provides as follows.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1)when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right
to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a
question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim
or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued
or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely
application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the
court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
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vention but nonetheless exercised its discretion to deny the motions,
giving two reasons for its decision. First, the trial court wanted to end
an already lengthy case. 52 Second, intervention would have delayed
relief on the job assignment claims that had been upheld by the appellate court because intervention would have required a separate hearing
on the hiring claims. The district court stated that it was "impractical if
not impossible to be running part of the case here and part before the
' 53
master on the job assignment claims.
B. The Hill II Proposal
In Hill 11,54 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated
the district court's denial of the motion for intervention and remanded
the case, declaring that the district court had abused its discretion.5 5
The court also stated that on remand "the original findings of discrimi-

nation in hiring might be reinstated were intervention allowed and the
intervenors found in the process to be adequate representatives. '5 6 The
court cited two advantages of reinstatement: conservation of judicial
57
resources and avoidance of inconsistent decisions.

52. Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 672 F.2d 381, 385 (4th Cir.) [HiII],cer. denied, 103 S. Ct. 318
(1982).
53. HillII, 672 F.2d at 385. An alternative ground for this result may be found in Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(b), dealing with partial entries of judgment.
54. Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 672 F.2d 381 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 318 (1982).
55. 672 F.2d at 387. The Hill 1court discounted the delay argument, pointing out that
bifurcation of proceedings is common in Title VII class actions. Western Electric, in its petition
for rehearing, argued that the bifurcation referred to by the court of appeals as common in Title
VII class actions was different from the bifurcation rejected by the trial judge. "Bifurcating Title
VII cases is a procedure commonly used to divide proof of liability from proof of individual
damages." Petition of Appellee for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 3, Hill v.
Western Elec. Co., 672 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. March 15, 1982). In Hi/ill , the court of appeals held
that the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to split the case, leaving "one portion of the
case in the initial stages of a Phase I inquiry [the hiring claim] while the other portion proceeds to
final judgment on the question of individual settlement to relief." Id Western Electric argued
that rejecting such an unusual procedure was not an abuse of discretion.
56. 672 F.2d at 387 (emphasis added). The district court's denial of the motion for interven.
tion was oral and did not explicitly mention the possibility of reinstating the original trial court's
findings. The court of appeals found that the would-be intervenors had presented this possibility
to the court. The court of appeals therefore considered it appropriate to "take that factor into
account on appeal." Id at 387 n.2.
57. Id at 387. The Hill!! court was concerned that the would-be intervenors, if denied the

right to intervene, would bring the class claim in a new action. By pointing out the danger of
"inconsistent sequential adjudication of the critical issues," id, the court presumably meant that a
new trial might result in findings of fact different from the findings in the original trial. But if the
defect in class representation in the original trial caused the findings to be different, it would be

improper to compare any new findings to the original findings; the original findings would have
been wrong. Before this argument for intervention and reinstatement is applicable. it must be true
that the original findings were not affected by the defect in class representation. See infra notes
58-64, 69-94 and accompanying text.
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In essence, the HillII proposal seeks to avoid repeating the origi-

nal trial because of mere technical defects in class representation. The
Hill II court conditioned reinstatement on a finding that the defect at

the original trial "probably" did not affect the result.58 The court also
safeguards specifically designed to prevent injury to either
fashioned
59

party.

To protect the defendant, the district court must determine

whether the employer would be unfairly prejudiced by reinstatement. 6°
In making this determination, the district court must allow the defendant to introduce evidence of events and circumstances occurring after

the findings were made that demonstrate prejudice.61 The court must,
that any reinstated findhowever, temper its inquiry by remembering
62
ings can be reviewed on appeal.
To protect the plaintiff class, the district court must consider
whether the intervenors support reinstatement of the findings and

whether the original defect in class representation resulted from a
"technical lack of identity of interest and injury," rather than inadequate representation. 63 The Hill II court reasoned that if the intervenors did not support reinstatement, or if there was inadequate
representation at the original trial, then the defect probably affected the

original findings of the trial court. 64

Judge Widener, dissenting in HillII, opposed the majority's proposal for several reasons. He argued that vacated findings are abso65
lutely void and cannot be reinstated under any circumstances.

Moreover, he stated that the majority's proposal was inconsistent with
58. 672 F.2d at 388.
59. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
60. 672 F.2d at 389.
61. Id at 391-92.
62. Id at 389.
63. Id One court has cited this language to support its holding that a class need not be
decertified after the original plaintiff is found to be an inadequate class representative provided
the class was certified before the inadequacy was determined. In Scott v. City of Anniston, 682
F.2d 1353 (lth Cir. 1982), a class was certified pursuant to a stipulation. After remand on a
-ifferent issue, the district court found the original plaintiffs to be inadequate class representatives.
The district court, therefore, dismissed the otherwise viable class claim.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it was error for the district court to
Jecertify the class. According to the court, there was "no indication that the representation was
Jeficient or less than vigorous." Id at 1357. The court cited HillI for the proposition that the
'determination of inadequacy [of class representation].. . may have been concerned only with a
:echnical lack of identity of interest and injury between representative and class." Id (quoting
F111I, 672 F.2d at 389).
64. Hill 1I, 672 F.2d at 388-89.
65. Id at 397-99 (Widener, J., dissenting).
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the Falcon "same harm or injury" requirement. 66 According to the dissent, the Hill II proposal would enable a district court to conduct a
class action without following Falcon. The class could correct any representation problem arising on appeal through intervenors and seek reinstatement of the findings. 67
As the dissent illustrated, the HillI proposal appears to be at least
a technical violation of the Falcon rule that plaintiffs must allege the
"same harm or injury" as the class members; the proposal purports to
give legal effect to findings made at a trial in which the plaintiffs did
not allege the "same harm or injury" as the class members. Whether
the Hill!! proposal actually contravenes the Falcon rule, however, can
be more accurately determined by examining the policies behind the
rule.
H1I.

THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE HILL !

PROPOSAL WITH FALCON

In rejecting the across-the-board approach in favor of the "same
harm or injury" requirement, the Falcon Court recited three policy
concerns: 1) avoiding prejudice to the defendants, 2) avoiding
prejudice to the plaintiff class members, and 3) avoiding practical
68
problems for the trial court.
A. Prejudiceto the Defendants.
The Falcon Court's first concern was that across-the-board class
actiois might be unfair to defendants. Courts may require an employer to prove that an individual was not discriminated against, but
asking an employer to prove that he has never discriminated against
anyone in the class would be overly burdensome. 69 Moreover, proving
the absence of such pervasive discrimination is more difficult for the
66. Id at 395-97 (Widener, J., dissenting). Judge Widener could not cite Falcon, of course,
because the case had not yet been decided. Instead, he cited Ro,'guez, a case the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had interpreted as supporting the "same harm or injury" requirement.
See supra notes 26-33, 48-49 and accompanying text.
Judge Widener asserted two additional grounds. First, he argued that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for intervention because of the delay involved and
the potential for prejudice to the defendants resulting from having to defend an overly broad,
"unmanageable" action. 672 F.2d at 392-93 (Widener, J., dissenting). Second, Judge Widener
argued that the district court did not abuse its discretion because none of the intervenors were
members of the class. Id at 393-95 (Widener, J., dissenting).
67. Id at 397-99 (Widener, J., dissenting).
68. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
69. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157-61. The Falcon Court did not say that it was impossible for an
employer to defend adequately against an across-the-board class claim, just that it was difficult.
Id at 160-61.
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employer because the issue is not closely related to what the plaintiff
must prove to support his individual claim.
When the plaintiffs satisfy the Falcon "same harm or injury" requirement, however, there is substantial similarity between the individual and class claims. It is therefore not unreasonably difficult for the
employer to defend both claims at the same trial. The Falcon footnote
fifteen exception to the abolition of the across-the-board class action is
presumably justified on similar grounds. To bring a footnote fifteen
across-the-board class action the plaintiffs must prove that a general
policy of discrimination exists and manifests itself throughout the employer's practices. 70 Both the class claim and the individual claim will
be based on the general policy of discrimination. Thus, defending
against the individual claim will be similar to defending against the
class claim.
The Falcon Court's holding was directed at preventing improper
across-the-board class actions from getting started. The Hill II proposal, however, is applicable only after an across-the-board class has been
incorrectly certified and the class issues tried. The employer will already have defended against the across-the-board class claims without
the presence of proper class representatives. The Falcon Court's original concern about prejudice to the defendant therefore translates into a
concern whether, because of representation defects, the employer actually defended inadequately, causing the trial court to make adverse
findings.
The HillfI proposal addresses this concern. According to the proposal, the trial court must decide whether the representation defect
"did or did not probably affect the merits. '" 7' The court also must decide whether the defendant "will be unfairly prejudiced by the reinstatement. ' 72 Thus, if the representation defect made it so hard for the
employer to defend that it "probably" resulted in the trial court making
73
prejudicial findings, then such findings should not be reinstated.
70. 457 U.S. at 157 n.15; see supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
71. HilllH, 672 F.2d at 388. More specifically, the Hill court stated that the general inquiry the trial court is to make when considering reinstatement is whether the representation defect "did or did not probably affect the merits in a way making reinstatement inappropriate." Id
The phrase "in a way making reinstatement inappropriate" presumably adds the conditions that
the change be material and prejudicial. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
72. HillH. 672 F.2d at 388.
73. If the trial court does reinstate its original findings, the defendants have two additional
protections: the right to appeal the findings for substantive review as if there had never been a
certification error and the right to present evidence of events and conditions arising after the
original findings were made that indicate prejudice to his side. Id at 391; see supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
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As stated before, the "same harm or injury" requirement is
designed in part to ensure that the employer will be able to defend itself
adequately against all claims. 74 Implicit in this aspect of the Falcon
requirement is the notion that the class representative's failure to meet
the "same harm or injury" test not only might make it harder for the
employer to defend, but will likely make it harder for the employer to
defend. Otherwise, the "same harm or injury" requirement would not
protect the employer's ability to defend. Thus, violation of the "same
harm or injury" requirement seems to raise a presumption that the employer will not know how to defend properly-in other words, a presumption of prejudice.
The HillII court did not incorporate this presumption into its proposal because it did not expressly allocate the burden of proof. To be
consistent with the Falcon Court' presumption of prejudice to the defendant, the HillI proposal should require that the intervenors prove
that the original defect in class representation did not affect the court's
findings on the merits. 75
74. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
75. The Hill 11 opinion offers little guidance for a court making such a kdetermination. Arguably, if the defendants would have conducted the earlier litigation differently had the intervenors been the original named plaintiffs, the defect in representation possibly "infected" the merits.
In Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 582 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1978), certain class members who
were not named plaintiffs testified at the trial and were later permitted to intervene. The district
court granted them relief based on their testimony. See Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp.,
439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, pointing
out that
the defendants' trial strategy was based on the assumption that the class-member witnesse' testimony was relevant only to the class-wide claim, or, perhaps, the individual
claim of the named plaintiffs. Defendants, in deposing and cross-examining the witnesses, focused on the allegations of the class-action racial discrimination; defendants
had no reason to challenge individual allegations ofwrongdoing not predicated on classwide discrimination.
582 F.2d at 832. If the intervenors in Dickerson had been named plaintiffs at the trial, the defendants would h4ve conducted their case differently. Thus, the intervenors should not be granted
relief.
The Dickerson court did not suggest what the relationship should be between the change in
the defendants' conduct of their litigation and the merits of the case. The court did not require as
a condition to a finding of prejudice to the defendants, for example, that the change in the conduct
of the defendants' case "necessarily" or "probably" affected the merits. The court merely found'
that because the defendants would have conducted their case differently there was "severe'
prejudice. Id
The converse of Dickerson is Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952). In Mullaney, after
permitting new plaintiffs to join on appeal in order to correct a newly discovered standing problem, the Supreme Court noted that joinder was proper because the earlier presence of the new
parties would not "have in any way affected the course of the litigation." Id at 417. The.Mullaney Court also did not specify a required relationship between earlier joinder and the outcome of
the case. As in Dickerson, the likely explanation is that the Court decided that because there
definitely would have been no effect on the outcome of the case, there was no need to establish a
required relationship.
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Prejudiceto the Class Members.
A second concern of the Falcon Court was "the potential unfair-

ness to the class members bound by the judgment if the framing of the
class is overbroad. ' '76 The HillII proposal is designed to address this

concern. To protect the plaintiff class from prejudicial findings the district court must consider whether reinstatement would be unfair to the
class. 77 Reinstatement presumably would be unfair to the class if the
representation defect "probably" affected the findings made by the
original trial court to the detriment of the class.
The Hill II court suggested two considerations for assessing
whether the representation defect "probably" affected the findings. The

first consideration is "whether the new class representative desires or
resists reinstatement."7 8 "If properly qualified new representatives are

satisfied with generally favorable findings.

.

it can reasonably be as-

sumed that the class members' primary interests in fairness.

. .

have

been served."'79 Intervenors must be adequate representatives before
reinstatement will be considered,8 0 and thus they will be assumed to act
Dickerson and Mullaney suggest that one factor affecting the outcome of a case is any change
in the way one side conducts its case because of a defect in representation. A court applying the
Hill I! proposal should consider whether potential changes to a party's strategy make it "probable" that the merits were affected by the defect in representation.
76. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161. According to the Falcon Court, the commonality and typicality
requirements of Rule 23(a) "serve as guideposts for determining whether ... the named plaintill's claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be
fairly and adequately protected in their absence." Id at 157 n.13. These requirements "tend to
merge" with each other and with the adequacy of representation requirement. Id. If the commonality and typicality requirements are not met, the class may not be adequately represented.
The Falcon Court also pointed out the possibility that the across-the-board approach could
result in a judgment unfavorable to the class. Id at 161. Citing Judge Godbold's concurring
opinion in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969), see supra
notes 20-21 and accompanying text, the Court identified "the error of the 'tacit assumption' underlying the across-the-board rule that 'all will be well for surely the plaintiffwill win and manna will
fall on all members of the class.'" Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161 (citing Johnson, 417 F.2d at 1127
(Godbold, J., concurring)). The defect in class representation implicit in across-the-board class
actions could cause the class's claim to be inadequately advanced in a way that harms the whole
class, just as the defect could cause the employer's defense to be inadequate. The dissimilarity
between the proof required to establish the representatives' individual claims and the proof required to establish the class claim makes it harder for a plaintiff not meeting the Falcon "same
harm or injury" requirement to adequately bring the class claim. Cf.supra note 69 and accompanying text (analyzing how the dissimilarity in proof makes it harder for the employer to defend).
77. Hill!!, 672 F.2d at 388-89.
78. Id at 388.
79. Id at 389.
80. Id at 390 ("If a proposed intervenor is found not formally qualified to act as a class
representative, the intervention inquiry as to that person obviously need proceed no further. If the
district court finds any of the proposed intervenors formally qualified to represent the class it
should then reconsider the motion for intervention. .. ").
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for the benefit of the class.8 1 Under the Hill!! proposal, if the intervenors do not want the original findings to be reinstated, then it is assumed that the class does not desire reinstatement either. Presumably,
the class's opposition to reinstatement suggests that the original class
representation was so inadequate that it "infected" the findings of the

original trial court.82
It does not necessarily follow from the intervenors' opposition to
reinstatement, however, that the defect in representation affected the
findings. Although the intervenors' resistance to reinstatement may be
evidence that the original findings were prejudicial to the class, there is
no implicit causal connection between resistance and "infected" merits. 8 3 Other motives might lead the intervenors to resist reinstatement.
For example, if the original findings were not sufficiently favorable to
the class, intervenors might not.support reinstatement, preferring to
take the chance that a new trial would yield more favorable findings.
Such a decision might be made in the interests of the class, but it would
not necessarily indicate that the original defect in representation affected the merits. Intervenors would want a new trial if they thought
for any reason that they would have a good chance for more favorable
findings.8 4 Therefore, district courts should be wary of undue reliance
on intervenors' opposition to reinstatement.8 5
81. Id at 389.
82. Id at 388.
83. See id at 391 (The desires of the intervenors for reinstatement "can be taken as an indication that the class, for its part, considers that the representation provided the class members'
interests in litigation ... was 'fair and adequate.'" (emphasis added)). Presumably the converse
is true: resistance to reinstatement by the intervenor may be taken as an indication that the class
does not consider its interests to be adequately protected.
84. For example, a class reprsentative, acting for the benefit of the class, would probably
want a new trial if the representative had hired better counsel, had located better witnesses, or had
unearthed helpful information. Because the intervenors probably will not volunteer matter such
as new information or theories without an extensive discovery process, the trial court will often
not be aware of these factors. Discovering other factors such as the intervenors' belief that the
trialjudge or jury simply erred in the first trial and will not do so again would involve an analysis
of the findings themselves. It may be true, however, that the court will be limited to just such an
analysis rather than directly evaluating the intentions of the intervenors because of a lack of better
information. When information that indicates the intervenors' resistance to reinstatement is not
based on inadequate prior class representation is revealed to the court, the court should not allow
reinstatement
85. In their Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Bane, Western Electric
argued that considering the desires of the intervenors in determining whether to allow reinstatement would allow proper plaintiffs to wait until findings are reached at the first trial before deciding whether to validate the findings by intervening and requesting reinstatement. Two factors
minimize this possibility. First, the would-be intervenors would risk losing at trial and then carrying the burden of showing that the named plaintiffs were improper on appeal. Second, even if the
intervenors are willing to assume this risk, the trial court could consider their motives in making
its decision whether to reinstate.
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The second consideration is whether the defect in class representation "was based solely upon a formal lack of identity of interests and
injury between representative and class or upon demonstrated ineffectiveness of representation."8' 6 The Hill I court reas6ned that, to the
extent the defect in representation is based on inadequate representation as well as "technical lack of identity of interest and injury,"8 7 the
defect may affect the determination of the merits.88 Furthermore, to
the "extent inadequacy is based solely upon lack of sufficient identity
of interest, any presumed adverse effect on the merits stemming from
89
this may in fact be utterly belied by the outcome."
This language responds to the Hill ! dissent's criticism that the
HillII proposal robs the Falcon "same harm or injury" requirement of
its "virtue." 90 One virtue of the Falcon requirement is that it prevents
inadequate representation of the class by requiring a sufficient identity
of interests between the class and the class representative. 91 Implicit in
this virtue is the notion that if there is insufficient identity of interests,
then inadequate representation is not only possible, but likely. Otherwise, the "same harm or injury" requirement would not protect the
class's interest in adequate representation. The failure of the class representative to meet the "same harm or injury" requirement, however,
does not necessarily mean that the class representation will be inadequate. Courts applying the Hill I proposal must judge whether the
class representation was in fact inadequate by analyzing the outcome of
the original trial.92 The Hill!! proposal does not rob the "same harm
or injury" requirement of its virtue because the proposal does not mandate reinstatement unless the danger the Falcon Court sought to prevent-inadequate representation in fact-is not present.
The Hill ! proposal could, however, rob the Falcon requirement
of some of its virtue if the courts do not allocate properly the burden of
proof. Just as the failure of the class representative to meet the "same
harm or injury" requirement creates a presumption of prejudice to the
defendant, 93 the failure gives rise to a presumption of prejudice to the
86. Hill II, 672 F.2d at 388.
87. Id at 389.

88. Id
89. Id

dissenting).
90. Id at 397 (Widener, J.,
91. See Falcon,457 U.S. at 161 justifying "same harm or injury requirement" on grounds of

potential unfairness to class).
92. The trial court's analysis, on remand, of whether class representation in the earlier proceeding was adequate will involve the same problems as the court's analysis of whether the defect
in class representation changed the findings sought to be reinstated to the detriment of the defendants. See supra note 75.
93. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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class. To preserve this presumption, the intervenors, as the moving
parties, should have the burden of showing no prejudice to the class,
just as the intervenors should have the burden of showing no prejudice
to the defendants.94
C. PracticalProblems.
The third concern of the Falcon Court was that "without reasonable specificity the court cannot determine whether the representation
is adequate." 95 A trial court confronted with a proposed across-theboard class may find it difficult to determine if a proposed class representative will adequately represent class interests.
The Hill!1 proposal requires a court to examine a prior proceeding to determine if there was adequate representation.9 6 In making this
determination, the court would have available for its consideration not
only the proposed class and class representative but the record of the
prior proceeding. Because the court would be exercising hindsight instead of foresight, its task would be easier, and the Falcon concern
would be mitigated.
There may, however, be other practical problems in applying the
Hill !! proposal. For example, the proposal envisions a hearing at
which the opposing sides argue the reinstatement issue. 97 This additional litigation could arguably consume the judicial time and resources saved by the reinstatement. On the other hand, refusing
reinstatement in cases in which it might be appropriate would constitute an even greater waste of judicial resources. 98 Furthermore, requesting a reinstatement hearing might become a dilatory tactic in
intervention cases.
A possible solution to these problems is to make the decision to
hold a hearing on reinstatement discretionary with the court. If the
trial court believes the case appropriate for such a hearing, then a hearing could be held. 99 Because of the danger of prejudice, however, find94. Id
95. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161 (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d
1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J.,concurring)).
96. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
97. Hll 11, 672 F.2d at 391-92.
98. C! Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 417 (1952) ("To dismiss the present petition [for

joinder] and require the new plaintifls to start over in District Court would entail needless waste
and runs counter to effective judicial administration...."). For discussions of Mullane,, see
supra
75, i-fra note 143.
. 99.note
The trial court's decision whether to allow reinstatement would not be easy. The
trial
court would focus on a prior proceeding that may have taken place years ago. The inquiry is also
largely subjective. The court would be examining factors such as the motives and desires of the
intervenors, ses pra notes 78-85 and accompanying text, and whether the defendants would have
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ings should not, in any case, be reinstated without a hearing.
IV.

REINSTATING VACATED FINDINGS

The viability of the HillII proposal depends on whether findings
vacated because of a defect in class representation can be given any
legal effect upon reinstatement. The Hill II dissent argued that they
cannot. 10 The main argument against reinstating vacated findings is
that the defect in class representation made the class claim moot. If the
class claim was moot, then the original trial court did not have a "case
or controversy" uinder article III101 and thus did not have jurisdiction
to make the findings sought to be reinstated.
There are two arguments for reinstating vacated findings under the
Hill II proposal. First, the class claim was never moot and therefore
reinstatement is proper whenever the defect in representation did not
prejudice the defendants. Second, even if the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make findings concerning the class claim, jurisdiction can be
conferred retroactively.
A.

Mootness of the Class Claim

Whether the failure of named plaintiffs to meet the commonality
and typicality requirements of Rule 23 renders the class claim moot
hinges on the article III "case or controversy" requirement. 0 2 The

"case or controversy" requirement has two elements; it "involves both

conducted their prior litigation differently had the intervenors been named plaintiffs in the original proceeding, see supra note 75.
Another concern of the Falcon Court was that "every Title VII case would be a potential
company-wide class action." 457 U.S. at 159 (footnote omitted). The Court stated that it found
"nothing in the statute to indicate that Congress intended to authorize such a wholesale expansion
of class-action litigation." Id This concern is probably not a separate issue in analyzing the Hill
II proposal for two -main reasons.
First, there is a split of authority over whether Congress intended to authorize private acrossthe-board class actions when it passed Title VII. Compare, e.g., H. NEWBERG. supra note 19,
§ 7973a ("The Congressional purpose expressed in the civil rights acts, of eliminating job bias, is
best accomplished by permitting any individual alleging unlawful discrimination to sue to rectify
all prejudicial activities involved.") and Developments, supra note 19, at 1220 ("the 'across-theboard' class action conception goes a long way toward effectuating the public interest") with
Rutherglen, supra note 18, at 724 ("Congressional policy, as expressed in Title VII and its legislative history, does not reflect a judgment of sufficient force and clarity to displace the usual operation of rule 23:').
Second, even if Congress did not intend to authorize across-the-board class actions when it
passed Title VII, it is reasonable to assume Congress and the Falcon Court shared the same concerns. If the Hilll proposal does not violate the three Falcon concerns, then it probably also does
not violate congressional expectations.
100. Hill It, 672 F.2d at 397-98 (Widener, J., dissenting).
101. U.S. CONsT. art. III, §2, cL I.
102. Id
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constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential

limitations on its exercise." 10 3 The constitutional limitation arguably
focuses on a minimal requirement of concrete adverseness1t 4 Pruden-

tial limitations include such policies as refusing standing to litigate generalized grievances 0 5 or to assert third-party rights. 0 6
Plaintiffs who try to bring Title VII class actions must meet both
individual and class representative standing requirements. 0 7 These requirements address distinctly different issues. Individual standing requirements refer to the article III "case or controversy" requirement, 08
103. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 US. 91, 99 (1979) (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina EnvtL Study Group, Inc.,

438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978) ("Our prior cases have, however, acknowledged 'other limits on the class of
persons who may invoke the courts' decisional and remedial powers,' which derive from general
prudential concerns ... ) (quoting WNar, 422 U.S. at 499) (citation omitted); Williamson,
FohAmedmnl StdingandExpectatioa of Ptivacy: Rakas v. IllinoisandNew Directionsfor
Some Old Concepts, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 831, 861 (1979) (Standing "involves both constitutional
and prudential limitations on federal court jurisdiction and its exercise.").
104. See, eg., LeBel, Standing After Havens Realty: A Critiqueand anA lternatlve Framework
forAnalydi, 1982 Dur=n LJ.1013, 1033 ("Article I ... arguably requires only an adversary
elationship between the parties on opposite sides of the litigation.").
105. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 (1974) (standing refused because
plaintiff's grievances were "shared with 'all members of the public' ") (quoting Ex pare Levitt,
302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)).
106. Se W1, 422 U.S. at 499. Some commentators have argued that such prudential limitations have "become a surrogate for decisions on the merits." Tushnet, 7heNew Law of Standing:
A PleaforAbandonment, 62 CORNELL L. Ray. 663, 663-64 (1977). "Decisions on questions of
standing are concealed decisions on the merits of the underlying... claim. The Court finds
handing when it wishes to sustain a claim on the merits and denies standing when the claim
would be rejected were the merits reached." Md at 663; see aso Williamson, supra note 103, at
135 (Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), "represents the first case in which the United States
Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged the close relationship between the concept of standing and the merits of the substantive claims presented by the litigants.").
107. Both mootness and standing are aspects of the general doctrine of 'justiciability" under
the "case or controversy" requirement. Mootness is "the doctrine ofstanding set in a time frame."
United States Parole Comm. v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980). Standing is the satisfaction of
article I requirements at the beginning of the litigation; mootness is the satisfaction of article II
requirements throughout the litigation. Id For discussions of individual and class representative
standing requirements, see H. NEw Eao, ispra note 19, §§ 7973-7983; C. WIuGlrr, LAW OF FEDEAL CouTS § 72 (3d ed. 1976); C. WioHT & A. MI.LE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 1759-1771 (1975). The distinction between "individual" and "class representative" standing is
unsettled. The requirement that the plaintiff be a member of the class arguably overlaps the Rule
23 commonality and typicality requirements. ButseeFalcon,457 U.S. at 157 n.13 ("The commonality and typicality requirements.. . tend to merge. .... Those requirements.. . also tend to
merge with the adequacy of representation requirement."). Newberg argues that individual standIng requirements should be analyzed separately from the adequacy of representation requirement.
For an argument that the typicality requirement is superfluous, see Comment, Federal ule of Civi
ProcerAwe 23(a)(3) T)picality Requirement: T7e Supeffuous Prerequisite to Maintaining a Class
Action, 42 OHto ST. LJ.797 (1981).
108. U.S. CoNsT. art. ,§ ZcL 1.
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the Title VII "aggrieved person" requirement, 0 9 and arguably the requirement that the plaintiff be a member of the class.110 Class representative standing requirements concern Rule 23 prerequisites such as
a common question of law or fact, typicality of claims or defenses, and
adequate representation."' Because the "same-harm or injury" requirement comes from the commonality and typicality requirements of
Rule 23, the failure to meet the "same harm or injury" requirement is a
defect in class representative standing. Therefore, the failure to meet a
class representative standing requirement, such as the "same harm or
injury" requirement, does not necessarily imply that an individual
standing requirement, such as the "case or controversy" requirement, is
not met.
The constitutional element of the "case or controversy" requirement is met whenever the HillI proposal is applicable. To satisfy this
element the parties must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome" 1 2 as to ensure that "the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be
presented in a form historically capable of judicial resolution.""11 3 This
"personal stake" standard is minimal,1 14 arguably calling only for an
adversarial relationship between the parties." 5 In cases in which the
HillII proposal is applicable this adversarial relationship requirement
is satisfied because the parties, by definition, will have litigated the
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-5(f)(3) (1976). Most courts have given a brofd meaning
to the term "aggrieved person." These courts "hold that the 'conditions of employment' nomenclature of Title VII protects the total work environment." H. NEWBERG, supra note 19, § 7973a.
The "conditions of employment" nomenclature comes from 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976):
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privilegs of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
olgl ....
Thus, "any employee functioning in an atmosphere affected by discrimination has suffered the
requisite injury in fact to make him or her an 'aggrieved person."' H. NEWERG, supra note 19,
§ 7973a ;see also Carr v. Conoco Plastics. 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 951 (1970)
(standing of plaintiffs upheld even though they were not personally and directly exposed to the
discrimination); EEOC Case No. YSF 9-108, CCH EEOC Decisions (1973) 6030 (June 26, 1969)
(a white employee was "aggrieved" by discrimination directed at blacks because the situation was
a condition of his work environment).
110. For a discussion of membership in the class as an additional individual standing requirement, see H. NEWBsRG, supra note 19, § 7973d. Individual standing is a prerequisite for asserting
a class claim and also satisfies constitutional requirements.
I ll. Federal Rule 23(a) is set out in relevant part, supra note 5.
112. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
113. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
114. See LeBel, supra note 104, at 1037 ("Ifthe constitutional barriers to standing are lowered
to the level suggested above, all but the few suits that can be labeled 'collusive' will clear the
Article III hurdle.") (footnote omitted); Tushnet, supra note 106, at 680 ("Thus, standing in its
pure article III form imposes only a very minor limitation on the availability of a federal forum.").
115. See supra note 104.

DUKE LAW JOURNVAL

[Vol. 1983:821

class claim in a fully adversarial proceeding without prejudice to either
side.
The "case or controversy" requirement's prudential concerns are
not controlling in cases in which the Hill!! proposal is applicable. For
example, the prudential limitation on plaintiffs asserting third-party
rights does not apply. The Supreme Court, in Warth v. Seldin, stated
that "Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who
otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules."' 16 Congress
authorized class actions by approving Rule 23, thereby circumventing
7
the prudential limitation on third-party causes of action.'
It is also inappropriate to bypass the merits of cases in which the
Hill!! proposal is applicable by invoking other prudential limitations.
The proposal saves judicial time and resources." 8 Moreover, the proceeding by definition will have been fair.' 1 9 Invoking the "case or controversy" requirement's prudential limitations in such cases would
waste time and money and would contravene long-standing antidiscrimination policies.
This note's conclusion that the class claim is not moot in cases in

which the Hill!! proposal is applicable is consistent with the two most
recent Supreme Court decisions linking the "case or controversy" requirement to class claims. In Deposit Guaranty National Bank v.
Roper,1 20 the district court refused to certify a class, ruling that the
class did not meet the requirements of Rule of 23(b)(3). 12 1 The defendant then tried to settle the case with the named plaintiffs, offering to
pay them the maximum sum they might have recovered from their individual claims. The plaintiffs rejected the offer. The district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs based on the defendant's
settlement offer. The plaintiffs appealed the district court's class certification ruling, despite the defendant's argument that the entry of judg116. 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).

117. See Tushnet, supra note 106, at 679 ("By providing for class actions within the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, Congress conferred standing on [plaintiffs] who, absent congressional
action, would not have been allowed to litigate the underlying substantive issues.").
In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), the Supreme Court held that post-certification failure
of the plaintiff's individual claim did not moot the class claim. Professor Tushnet states that
Sosna stands for the proposition that "a retrospectve determination that a case has been litigated
in a concrete setting allows a court to reach the merits of a controversy. Article III seems to
require no more." Tushnet, supra note 106, at 679 (emphasis added). Concluding that cases in

which the Hill II proposal is applicable are not moot involves just such a retrospective
determination.
118.
119120.
121.

See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See spra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
445 U.S. 326 (1980).
The district court opinion is not reported.
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ment rendered the case moot. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit rejected the mootness argument and ordered the district court
to certify the class because Rule 23 had been complied with.'2
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the district
court's entry of judgment ended the plaintiffs' individual claims, the
plaintiffs still had an assertable economic interest in the certification of
the class.'23 Specifically, the Roper Court noted that certification
would enable the named plaintiffs to spread their litigation costs.1 24
In a companion case, United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 2 5 the plaintiffs individual claim was rendered moot just before
the district court denied certification. The Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff could appeal the ruling denying class certification even though
his individual claim was moot. According to the Geraghty Court, the
article III "case or controversy" requirement has two parts. First, there
must be a continuing "live" controversy. Second, there must be some
party with a "personal stake" in the outcome of the case. 126 In applying the "personal stake" requirement, the Court held that although the
plaintiff had never alleged any personal interest in the certification
question, 127 he nonetheless satisfied the requirement because he "continue[d] to vigorously advocate his right to have a class28 certified" in a
concrete factual setting capable of judicial resolution.
Under Roper and Geraghty the class claim in a Hill II situation is
not rendered moot by the class representative's failure to meet the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23. The first requirement--that there be a continuing "live" controversy-is met because
the class controversy has actually been litigated. 29
The original class representative contemplated by the Hill I1 proposal also meets the liberal "personal stake" standard established in
Roper and Geraghty. The Geraghty Court emphasized the "flexible
character" of the article III requirements.130 The Court stated that "the
122. Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1111-16 (5th Cir. 1978), af'd sub nora. Deposit
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
123. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 328-40 (1980).

124. Id at 334 n.6, 338 n.9.
125. 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
126. Id at 395-97. This two-part test has been acknowledged. See Zeidman v. J.Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1030, 1041-42 (5th Cir. 1981); Ford v. United States Steel Corp., 638 F.2d
753, 760 (5th Cir. 1981).

dissenting).
127. See Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J.,
128. Id at 404.

129. The Geraghty Court found a "live" controversy because class members were trying to
intervene. 445 U.S. at 396; see also Ford v. United States Steel Corp., 638 F.2d 753, 760 (5th Cir.
1981). The HillI1 proposal by definition involves intervention.

130. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 400.
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purpose of the 'personal stake' requirement is to assure that the case is
in a form capable of judicial resolution."' 3' That is, there must be
"sharply presented issues in a concrete factual setting and self-interested parties vigorously advocating opposing positions."' 32 The Roper
Court characterized an economic interest in spreading litigation costs
as a sufficient "personal stake."' 33 In a Hill ! situation, the plaintiff,
by qualifying as an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Title
VII, 34 probably satisfies the "personal stake" requirement. 35 Because
a named plaintiff in a Hill !! situation would by definition have litigated the claims without prejudice to either side, he would meet the
"personal stake" requirement by having asserted "sharply presented
issues"' and by "vigorously advocating opposing positions."' 37 Finally, the plaintiff would have an economic interest in spreading litiga38
tion costs similar to that of the plaintiff in Roper.'
B. Retroactive Jrisdiction.
The second rationale for allowing reinstatement of vacated findings--retroactive assignment of jurisdiction-applies even if the class
claim was moot and the trial court was therefore without power to
make findings concerning the class. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit developed this retroactive jurisdiction concept in Finn v. American Fire and Casualty Co. 39 Finn arose on
remand from the Supreme Court's holding that the federal district
court had no jurisdiction over the case, due to the lack of complete
131. Id at 403.

132. Id
133. Roper, 445 U.S. at 334 n.6, 338 n.9; see Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 400.

134. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
135. In Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc.. 555 F.2d 270 (10th Cir. 1977). the court
allowed a plaintiff to represent the class simply because he had a "present, past and future interest" as an employee in stopping his employer's discrimination. Id at 277. See generally Comment, The Headess Class Action: The Effect of a Named PlaintrsPre-CerOpcationLoss of a
PersonalStake, 39 MD. L. REV. 121, 141-52 (1979).
136. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 403.
137. Id
138. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Scott v. City of Anniston. 682 F.2d 1353 (11th Cir. 1982), see supra note 63, supports the proposition that a "case or
controversy" can exist between a class improperly represented and a defendant. In holding that a
class need not be decertified after the original plaintiff was found to be an inadequate class representative provided the class was certified before the determination of inadequacy, the Scott court
addressed the question whether a continuing controversy existed. According to the court, although certain relief the class had requested was no longer necessary because the defendant had
altered its behavior, the class could still pursue other relief. 682 F.2d at 1358. This holding implicitly recognizes the existence of a controversy at least as to the other relief between the improperly
represented class and the defendant.
139. 207 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954).
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diversity among the parties. 40 The plaintiffs sought to dismiss as to
certain dispensable parties and thereby perfect diversity and jurisdiction. The trial judge, however, refused to reinstate his original findings,
14
pointing out his lack of power to make them in the first place. '
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
the plantiff's dismissal as to the dispensable parties would be given retroactive effect, so long as the remaining defendant had not been
42
prejudiced in the prior proceeding because of the jurisdictional error.1
In the absence of such prejudice, the court noted, "[e]very consideraof justice detion of promptness and dispatch in the administration
43
mands that the first trial should be preserved."'
These same considerations of promptness and dispatch apply in a
HillII situation. The intervention of new plaintiffs essentially corrects
a 'Jurisdictional" error. Because the Hill ! proposal requires that reinstatement not prejudice either side, retroactive assignment ofjurisdiction to the original trial proceedings would be consistent with Finn and
would allow reinstatement of the trial court's findings.
This argument is also consistent with the established principle that
amendments correcting jurisdictional defects in complaints are to be
liberally allowed to prevent dismissals because of technicalities. '
Such amendments are allowed even after final judgment has been en140. The Supreme Court's opinion is reported at 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
141. 207 F.2d at 115. The opinion of the district court is not reported.
142. Id at 115-16.
143. Id at 116. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied Finn in Eklund v. Mora,
410 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1969). The E-dund court held that when "the first trial was free from error
apart from a jurisdictional matter, a new trial was not mandatory and judgment could be entered
on the original verdict after the correction of the jurisdictional flaw." Id at 732.
In Burleson v. Coastal Recreation, Inc., 572 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1978), the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that a winning plaintiff dissatisfied with the damages awarded could not
overturn the trial court's judgment for lack of jurisdiction when an indispensable party to the
judgment could be dismissed to correct the jurisdictional error. The court cited Finn as
controlling.
Similarly, in Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952), the Supreme Court permitted new
plaintiffs to join after trial in order to correct a standing problem that had been raised on appeal.
According to the Court, the joinder of the new plaintiffs merely put "the principal, the real party
in interest, in the position of his avowed agent." Id at 417. The Court also noted that earlier
joinder would not have affected the course of the original litigation, and that to deny joinder
would waste judicial resources. Id
Finn, Eklund, Burleron, and Mullaney stand for the proposition that a court lacking jurisdiction may be deemed to have had jurisdiction if, during the same case, the jurisdictional error is
corrected without prejudice to the defendants.
144. See Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 311 (6th Cir. 1974) ("Amendment to establish jurisdiction is broadly permitted, so as to ... avoid dismissals on technical grounds."); FED. R. Civ. P.
15(a) ("leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires").
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tered.' 45 Amending a complaint after final judgment in effect assigns
jurisdiction retroactively. The Hill II proposal is consistent with this
practice because it, in effect, also corrects a technicality after a final
judgment has been entered. Moreover, these amendments are confined
to the same case, consistent with the constitutional notion that jurisdiction is meant to be defined in terms of a case, rather than an issue. 146
V.

CONCLUSION

A district court implementing the Hill HI proposal on remand

should adopt the following procedure. The court must first determine
whether the intervenors are adequate class representatives. If they are

not, intervention should be denied. If the intervenors are proper plaintiffs, intervention should be permitted, and the court must consider

whether to allow reinstatement of its previous findings.
145. See Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 581 F.2d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.denied,
439 U.S. 1135 (1979) (although amendment is generally not permitted after a final decision, "an
amendment can be allowed with leave of the Court of Appeals."); Eklund v. Mora, 410 F.2d 731,
732 (5th Cir. 1969) ("Upon leave of the court a party may amend defective allegations ofjurisdiction, even after judgment has been entered or an appeal taken."); 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (1976) ("Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in the trial of appellate courts.").
146. The Constitution refers to "cases," not "questions." U.S. CONST. art. II. The doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction permits a federal court to assume jurisdiction over state claims related to
federal claims. If the federal claim, the basis for jurisdiction, is dismissed during trial, the court
can decide the state claim because the court has already been deemed to have jurisdiction over the
"case." The relationship between the state and federal claims determines the scope of the "case."
Retroactive jurisdiction in a situation in which the Hill!1 proposal is applicable never violates this
relationship requirement because the findings sought to be reinstated arise out of the same claim
that intervention has given the court the power to decide. There does not seem to be a logical
distinction between a case that has "technical" jurisdiction at the beginning, and then loses it, and
a case that lacks "technical" jurisdiction at the beginning and then acquires it. In the first situation, jurisdiction is deemed to exist throughout the case. In the latter situation jurisdiction also
can be deemed to have existed throughout the case without violating constitutional requirements.
See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 19 (3d ed. 1976); 13 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567 (1975). This "same case" requirement distinguishes cases in which the Hill 1 proposal is applicable from the line of cases holding that
vacated findings have no resjudicata effect. See, eg., Continental Casualty Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 605 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1979); Simpson v. Motorists
MUL Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 850 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, 419 U.S. 901 (1974); De Nafo v. Finch, 436
F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1971). But cf.Dunlop v. Rhode Island, 398 F. Supp. 1269 (D.RI. 1975) (vacated
holding of prior case has no collateral estoppel effect, but findings of fact of prior case may be
adopted if no new evidence is presented). The argument against the Hill !! proposal would be
that because vacated findings cannot be given legal effect as binding precedent, they cannot be
given legal effect by being reinstated. The res judicata line of cases is distinguishable, however,
because in those cases courts are prohibited from giving legal effect to vacated findings in cases
different from the one in which the findings were made. To justify reinstating findings in a res
judicata situation, it would have to be proper for a court in one case to retroactively apply its
jurisdiction to a different case. The Hill.I! proposal only involves retroactive assignment ofjurisdiction to the "same case."

Vol. 1983:821]

EMPL OYMENT DISCRIMINA TION

847

Reinstatement should be allowed only when neither side is
prejudiced. To determine if there would be prejudice, the district court
should consider holding a hearing at which the central inquiry would
be whether the defect in class representation at the original trial "probably" affected the findings sought to be reinstated. If the district court
finds that the prior defect in class representation did not "probably"
affect the merits, then reinstatement should be allowed. The intervenors should, however, have the burden of proving that the findings were
not affected.
When applied in this manner, the Hill II proposal is consistent
with the Falcon Court's purposes for establishing the "same harm or
injury" requirement. The Hill!I proposal's requirements that there be
no prejudice to either side mirror the Falcon Court's concerns. The
likelihood that the HillI! proposal can save considerable time and resources argues for its availability in appropriate cases.
Robert P. Monyak

